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Peace, stability, security and prosperity are the key words stressed 
in the Declaration, approved at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 
in Barcelona last November. This is understandable considering that 
these four virtues are markedly scarce in the Mediterranean region. 
There is no denying however that the four are intimately connected 
so that it cannot be realistically assumed that one of them could be 
secured and enjoyed in the longer-term without the other three. 
Instability in the Mediterranean arises mainly from the historical 
sub regional conflicts, from the attempt of radical states to radicalise 
international relations in the region, and from the internal instability 
of some states. A sense of insecurity arises because' of the national 
military buildups by some key actors, unresolved conflicts, the 
historic experience of the use of force to resolve issues, and, above 
all, the imbalance between strong and populous states' on the one 
hand and small, unarmed countries on the other hand. Many 
countries sense their own II vulnerability" ,. in the meaning employed 
by Buzan 1, who distinguished between: threats, sometimes very 
1 Buzan Barry, People, Sta~e8 and Fear: An Agenda For International Security 
Studies In The Post -C~/d War Era, Harvester and Wheatsheaf, (2nd edition) 
1991, pages tt2 forward. Buzan distinguishes between threats and 
vulnerabilities. Weak states (because they are small) are vulnerable in many 
senses , mostly as a result of their smallness .. Larger states, as well as small ones, 
can be vulnerable by. virtue of their strategic geographic position, the fact that 
they possess important raw materials which other countries want or weak intemal 
institutions which invite foreign intervention. 
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hard to perceive, and vulnerabilities, which he ;.claims "are fairly 
concrete". In the case of many Mediterranean .states, this 
vulnerability arises from the strategic positions they occupy: Turkey 
at thc? head of the Dardanelles, Egypt on the Suez Canal, Morocco 
and Spain command the narrow passage linking the Mediterranean 
. with the Atlantic, the Straits of Gibraltar, Malta the main seaways in 
the midst of the Mediterranean, and Cyprus a geostrategic position 
close to Turkey and the' Middle East. Some of them possess 
important mineral resources such as oil, gas or phosphates. 
Some have a "historical sense" of vulnerability vis a vis more 
powerful neighbours (Greece - Turkey, Cyprus - Turkey ) The 
nation state is by historic time-scale a recent artifact. Hence, the 
internal weakness of such states, their unstable institutions and 
economic problems increase their vulnerability to external 
meddling, strengthens their disposition to aims buildups to 
overcome their perceived vulnerabilities and in tum present a 
security dilemma to their neighbours. Most of the countries of the 
region have only recently emerged from colonial rule. The growing 
strength o(political movements which challerIge the internal 
status quo in some key 'countries- is also viewed as a source of both 
~instability and insecurity. Terrorism appears to be endemic to the 
region. Drug trafficking, is a growing concern hi tandem with ~e 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Falling prosperity is 
evident on both the northern as well as southern shores of the 
Mediterranean. In the south it is reflected in the falling GNP per 
capita ratios, as economic growth continues to be generally positive 
but inadequate to keep up with demographic changes. On the 
northern shore countries ~t, is epitomised by the growing 
'developmental gap' betw~en the southern and northern regions of 
Europe. On, both shores rising unemployment, an inadequate 
economic infrastructure, social and health care problems bedevil 
governments. In the southern shore states, a liberai democratic state 
structure based on the full and adequate participation of the people, 
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expectancy of peaceful change in governance through fair. elections, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights are still far from 
becoming the nonn, making such states prone to change by violent 
means and raising concern in Europe about their long-tenn stability. 
The European Union has long realised that instability in the 
Mediterranean region can possibly have destabilising effects on 
Europe itself.2 Lacking the institutions and the legal basis for joint 
political action by the Member States in the fields of security and 
defence, it acted as a civilian power in the region, employing 
economic statecraft to achieve political aims. The first association 
agreements signed with Greece and Turkey in the early sixties were 
particularly aimed at strengthening the economic stability of these 
key NATO countries in the era of the policy of containment. It used 
the associati~n agreement with Greece to show its disdain of the 
military junta while the latter reigned in Athens, and finally it 
opened its doors wide open to Greece, Spain and Portugal in order 
to stabilise the democratisation and modernisation process 
following the end of the dictatorships in the three countries. 
Similarly, the European Union is employing like means in its efforts 
to stabilise the situation in central and eastern Europe as well as the 
Mediterranean region. In the. past, it skilfully employed the Global 
Mediterranean Policy, (GMP) to bind ~l the countries· of the region 
(except Libya and Albania which refused a fonnal accord with the 
Community) in a relationship to it, though this did not always turn 
out to be a happy one, especially from the late seventies onwards 
when the Community applied protectionist measures against the 
MNCs on textile and clothing goods. The GMP has had a positive 
effect in helping the Ml-.fCs maintain their traditionally important 
2 Lorenzo Natali, BC Commissioner "We must question whether the Community 
could survive a serious disturbance in the Mediterranean region ... ", quoted in the 
European File Series, No 19/82 (1982) . This assertion has been repeated in many 
policy declarations, including Conclusions of the Presidency of the EU which are 
too numerous to list here. 
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exports to Metropolitan Europe, partially transforming the 
relationship from one of dependence into interdependence, but in 
the seventies, when Europe found itself in economic difficulties it 
quickly turned protectionist so that this policy stance combined with 
supply-side problems on the part of the MNCs quickly led to 
disgrunt1ement with the GMP. Besides, the instruments of the GMP 
to tackle the present problems which the EU faces in the 
Mediterranean region are inadequate, both because these challenges 
demand twofold political and economic initiatives, not merely 
economic statecraft, and because in the post-Maastricht setting, 
when the EU is supposed to be developing a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) it cannot limit itself to GMP methods~ while 
the efficiency of its policies has to be judged against the exploited 
and unexploited potential of the Maastricht Treaty. In the past, the / 
EC had tried to remedy its obvious lack of a foreign policy by ) 
creating the European Political Co-operation (EPC). However, a.:p 
EC foreign policy never came into being. Europe found itself 
divided on many key issues, not least among these those related to 
the Mediterranean region. The ECls response to the Middle East war I 
of 1967 and then to the first oil crisis in 1974 brought in to focus the 
divisions among European states. Subsequently, hopelessly unable 
'" to give substance to many of its policies, Europe limited itself to a 
declarative foreign policy largely based on issuing statements, many 
of which were exceptional in their content and foresight, 
notwithstanding that at times they met with incredulous criticism 
from the United States.3 During the cold war, Europe played second 
fiddle to the superpowers in the maintenance of the military balance 
of power in the region and was virtually absent in the most 
important of the Mediterranean crises, notably the Middle East 
3 The famous Venice Declaration on the Middle East adopted by Council in June 
1980, [Bulletin of the European Communities, No 6, 1980 pages 10-11] was a 
case in point. It irritated the United States because it was seen to interfere with its 
Middle East diplomacy as well as Israel because it was seen to favour the Arab 
World. 
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problem. Lastly, in the absence of a European foreign policy, the 
member states of the EC were left free to conduct their own foreign 
policies as dictated by their respective national interests, with some 
feeble attempts to co-ordinate them, lest they face the graver 
accusation that they were sidetracking the more profound aim of 
developing EPC. The weakness of EPC was not only exploited but 
used as an. excuse for individual forays. This resulted in a number of 
premature initiatives in the region, all cursed with the seeds of 
failure from their beginnings. Reference to these initiatives win be_ 
made further down. 
The new phase in the EU's relations with the Mediterranean 
countries, launched with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership started 
in Barcelona will perhaps put an end to unco-ordinated national . 
initiatives and weld the- economic and political aspects of Europe's 
policy in the region more tightly. It has the advantage of making the 
Union's Mediterranean policy a policy for the whole of the Union 
rather than one -limited to the Mediterranean member states. 
However, it is rather still ear:ly to start celebrating the success of this 
policy. . 
F or a start, history testifies to the fact that 'the attention which the 
ED has given to the Mediterranean region in the past has been 
dyslexic, even in times when the Mediterranean region was the only 
one where the Community could play a role in the external arena. 
-The pattern, of .the EC's policies towards the region has been 
historically marked by flurries of intense activity followed by long 
pauses of inertia as the Community busied itself with internal 
matters. A period of inertia followed ~e signing of the fust 
Association agreements with two Mediterranean countries at the 
start of the sixties and in fact, throughout the eighties to the 
beginning of the nineties, the BC neglected the Mediterranean 
_ region as it busied itself with a number of internal and external 
. . '. . 
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problems: internally the completion of the internal market, the 
Single European Act, the intergovernmental conference which led 
to the signing of· the Maastricht Treaty, the difficult· ratification 
process; externally - the completion of the negotiations leading to 
the second enlargement (Spain and Portugal, 1985), negotiations 
with the EFTA group for the creation of the European Economic 
Area (EEA), enlargement negotiations with the EFTA group, the 
Uruguay Round of negotiations, and finally after 1989 the situation 
in Central and Eastern Europe. It was in response to growing 
criticism that the EU was neglecting the Mediterranean region and 
the need to reintroduce some balance in its external relations that, in 
June 1990, proposals were put forward by the Co~ission for 
redirecting the EU's Mediterranean policy. From there onwards it 
took another five years for the proposal to be developed into the I 
idea of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched last i 
November. 
This ambivalence may be explained by the fact that with only five 
Mediterranean member states (if Portugal is considered as such) the , 
European Union is essentially a northern-central' European entity. 
Of the five Mediterranean states,- Spain and Portugal have only 
recently joined the Community anci have been practically engrossed 
with adjusting to their new situation. France, described by Braudel4 
as having throughout its history mostly identified with central 
Europe, remains true to form in the contemporary age. Italy, always 
beset by domestic political problems, generally shuns external 
action. This· has been more pronounced since the "end of the first 
4Braudel Fernand, The ldentity of France, Volume II, Fontana Press, page IISince 
the time of Caesar, and weH before, up to the great barbarian invasions in the 
fifth century, the history of France was a fragment of Mediterranean history. The 
events which happened around the middle sea, even if they happened a long way 
from the shores of France, detennined the country's life. But', after the invasions, 
leaving aside the exceptions like the belated wars for the domination of Italy, 
France idl"ntified with, above all , Central and Eastern Europe. II 
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Republic". Greece' is interested only in the Aegean and' Turkey as 
we have been shown time and again, and has used its EC 
membership to condition rurkey and more recently to undermine 
Macedonia, with little time to spare for more comprehensive ideas 
on the Mediterranean region as a whole. The enlargement of the EU 
to include Malta and Cyprus will provide the Union with mixed 
blessings: Cyprus will reinforce Greece's policy - thus giving a 
negative contribution to the developluent of the CFSP; Malta will 
presumably follow a policy more consistent with the overall 
interests of the ED in the Mediterranean - thus giving a positive 
contribution to the development of the Mediterranean policy. 
The Mediterranean member states of the ED now have the 
opportunity to change old habits. Euro-Mediterranean leaders 
meeting in Barcelona agreed to establish a comprehensive 
partnership among all the states of the littoral, based on an ongoing 
dialogue. Three main pillars were singled out for the realisation of 
these plans:" the establishment of a common area of peace and 
security; . creating an area of shared prosperity; and developing 
human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and 
exchanges between civil societies. The Barcelona Declaration is 
thus a manifesto of good intentions for the Mediterranean region. 
The frequent use of the word 'dialogue' elicits sentiments of deja vu 
and reminds one that this is after all a continuation of the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue began with much fanfare in'19755 over the heads' of the 
Americans 'worried that it would inject too much noise into 
Kissinger's Middle East diplomacy model; or that it would decouple 
Europe from the United states and split the Western camp. That 
'dialogue' of the deaf, as it turned out, led to few tangible results as 
the Europeans struggled to secure guarantees of uninterrupted oil 
5 The Cairo Joint Memorandum of June 1975 which began the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue is a much shorter document thiin the Barcelona Declaration. However 
the underlying philosophy is the same. 
"I 'H 
II! 
I 
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supplies at reasonable prices while the Arab side tried in vain to 
promote the Palestinian question. When world markets pushed oil 
prices down, the 'dialoguet lost much of its luster for the European 
side, while the divisions in the Arab world following the Camp 
David accords weakened the interest of the other counterpart as 
well. The process became another sad chapter in the history of 
Euro-Mediterranean relations. It underlined the fact that the two 
sides had ignored real designs and had opted instead for vague 
idealistic ones. Had they adhered to the Cairo Joint Memorandurn6 
both sides would have achieved more lasting results. 
Before Barcelona, when it had already finalised its not so II grand 
design" for the Mediterranean region, the European Union decided 
to underwrite the effort with a not very generous, but certainly not f 
negligible sum of ECU 4.7 billion to be disbursed over a period of 
five years (1995-99) in aid to the Non-Member Mediterranean 
countries (MNCs). 7 Originally the Commission had proposed a total 
aid programme of ECUs 5.5. billion in addition to European 
6 In the Cairo Joint Memorandum it was stated bY,both sides that the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue should be : 
UO) based on equality between partners; (U) based on their mutual interest; (iii) a 
• complement to the co-operation that already exists wbetween the European 
Community and certain members of the Arab League." from liThe European 
Community and The Arab World" , Europe InfoIDtation Development,. 
Commission of the EC, DE 38/1982. 
7For example to get an idea of the extent of the Ee's aid to the, Mediterranean 
non-Member countries, a comparison must be made between the EC aid to its 
own backward regions as part of the IIstructural funds" and the aid it is promising 
to extend to the MNCs. Ireland, Greece and Portugal with a combined popUlation 
of less than 25 million have signed Community Financing Agreements providing 
for an expenditure of ECUs 69.8 billion over the period 1993-99 as action under 
the structural funds, of which ECUs 33.58 billion will be provided from the 
structural funds while the rest will be provided by the member states concerned. 
The figures do not include transfers from the Cohesion Fund. By contrast the aid, 
offered to the Mediterranean countries with a combined population of over 200 
million is a mere 4.7 biUion ECUs 
/ 
I 
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Investment Bank (EIB) resources.8 This financial aid package is 
simply a continuation of the tradition of financial aid started with 
the begitming of the so called 'Global Mediterranean Policy' (GMP) 
in the mid-seventies. It is true that the EU has a right to a 
"Community Preference" in favour of its own backward regions in 
disbursing development aid. However, the differences in the rate of 
such aid are staggering (for example, aid to the MNCs is lower on a 
per capita basis than that given to Central and Eastern Europe, while 
when compared with that given to Ireland, Portugal and Greece 
under the structural funds, such aid to the MNCs compared on a per 
capita basis is 57 times lower). When consideration is taken of the 
fact that the EUrs own backward regions are by comparison more 
developed than the MNCs the inadequacy of financial aid to the 
Mediterranean countries becomes even more staggering. Not 
oblivious to the accusations that this sum was inadequate9 and that 
it did not add to as much as the EU was spendipg on central and 
eastern Europe, and noting that Europe's declared 'aim to maintain a 
balance'in its relations with all its neighbours, the EU finally threw 
in the sop that this fund will be augmented by unspecified fmancial 
assistance from the European Investment Bank- (EIB) and from 
bilateral aid agreements. 
The question of financial aid to the MNCs is linked to the issue of 
whether a sound case for it can be put forward. 'The matter is 
8 See the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, "Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: 
Establishing a Euro-Mediterr~ean ·Partnership'!' Com (94) 427 [mal of 
19.10.1994; "Against this backgroun~, the Commission considers that in order to 
implement the wide range of policies invoked above, an indicative figure of 
around 5,500 m Bcu of budgetary resources' for the period 1995-99 wjJI be 
required for all Mediterranean non-member countries (not including Albania and 
ex-Yugoslavia). This would be in addition to increased lending from the EIB and 
other international financial institutions, bilateral aid from ~he Member states ... " 
. (point 24.6, page 15). .: 
9 The amount made available to the countries of Central and ,Eastern Europe over 
the same period is Eeus 6.7 billion. A straight comparison is however misleading. 
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somewhat complex. During the decade from the tthti-seventies to 
the mid-eighties, while increased wealth flowed to the oil producers 
and non-oil countries benefited from increased trade in goods and 
services (e.g earnings from workers' remittances) with them or loans 
. on very favourable terms, the negative effects of bad economic 
policies of extensive state intervention, subsidies, import 
substitution policies, capital controls, extensive bureaucracy etc 
could be hidden under the flow of petrodollars. Significantly among 
the MNCs five countries, all with a negligible or no dependence on 
the oil economy and which followed an open economic policy or 
launched one during the period10, at present have some of the more 
resilient economies in the region. Soon after the world price of oil 
started declining and revenues dried up significantly, the fissures 
began to appear and many MNCs were left perched on a high I 
foreign debt mountain. In the midst of this crisis the MNCs, 
prodded by the IMF and World Bank, were converted to the virtues ': 
of economic reform. Did they in fact have a choice? The: 
restructuring thus started under significantly adverse economic 
conditions, . compounded in some instances by a severe debt 
problem and rapid popUlation growth. 
It is within this context that the poor financial package offered by 
the EU should be discussed. One thing is certain: namely that the 
Union cannot take on the challenges of transformation occurring in 
central and eastern Europe and the Mediterranean simultaneously 
without overhauling its finances and without ditching the wasteful 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The relevant question is 
whether Europe should increase its aid package to a region (the 
Mediterranean) which had enjoyed a decade of surplus wealth but 
10 Israel, Tunisia, Cyprus and Malta were constrained to follow such policies due 
to their small domestic markets which made import substitution policies generally 
unworkable. Egypt commenced its open door policy in 1973. Morocco and 
Turkey, also non-oil producers, practised rife protectionism. 
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was unable to traIrM6nn it into more lasting economic development. 
The answer seems to be linked to the fact that the contextual 
frameworks are different. The former situation, when the MNCs 
failed to take advantage of the wind which blew in their sails was a 
missed opportunity. The present situation is however one in which 
the MNCs are reforming their economies and significant financial 
flows to stich economies in transition could help them overcome the 
unpopular adjustment co§ts and enhance their internal social and 
political stability. Previously, enough petrodollars existed in the 
region to help MNC governments maintain stability. Now they can 
no longer do'-so and 'Uncontrolled instability can slip over into the 
Community itself. The EC is not oblivious to the need of supporting 
reform. In the Euro-Mediterranean P~nership Agreements 
initialled between the EC and Tunisiall , Morocco l2 and Israel13 the 
priorities established for financial aid are to help the MNCs cope 
with reforms. The main questions remain whether the aid is 
sufficient and whether enough attention has been given to the time 
factor and cultural constraints., There is always a time lag between 
the proposed economic restru~ing and the benefits that accrue 
from such!initiatives. The second (i.e cultural constraints) is related 
to the fact that if may be axiomatically --difficult to ·transfer the 
values of liberalisation,' essentially of advanced, societi~, to 
countrie& which cultuhilly .; '- may' ,. still' ,be ~, unpiepar~'" ' for 
modernisation at such speed. Clearly the ecohomic decision-making 
carmot be divorced from the political. ' 
While falling short of fully underwriting the reforms in the 
Mediterranean noOn-member countries with more generous financial 
11 Agreement initialled between the Ee and Tunisia on April 12th, 1995, Com 
(95) 235 finalof31.05.1995. 
12'Agreement initialled between the EC and Mor~cco on November 15th, 1995, 
Com(95) 740 final of20.l2. 1995. 
13 -Agreement 'sig~~(i-be-tWeen--the EC and Israel on November 20th, 199j, 
Com(95) 618 final of29.11.1995. 
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aid, Europe has not shown itself sympathetic to the pO'rrdcalleeway 
which the MNCs should be allowed to- manage change either. 
Europe insisted that as part of the Euro-Med Partnership, the MNCs 
must gradually develop democracy and respect for human rights. 
Insistence on these Western values is positive, but not 
unproblematic. Europe must stand up for the respect of human 
rights_ However, transformation of the present regimes into 
democratic ones may, if it is allowed to happen before the economic 
refonns have. been given the chiIDce to bear their fruits, lead to the 
transfer of power from goveriunents which are not democratic 
(according to Western yardsticks) to governments which actually do 
not believe in the Western notion of democracy (the case of Algeria 
is instructive). The adverse implications for Europe of such a 
development need not be spelled out. Perhaps the aberration in this 
case is the non-truth that the development of market economies and 
democratic principles need move hand in hand. On the other hand 
the maintenance of authoritarian rule it:l :some MNCs may be needed " 
to see the reforms through, once other means such as' increased 
financial aid ~e Unavailable to underWrite the process. Once market 
economies have' bloomed, democracy, may come charging in its 
traiL Is this not the path which sOJlle ·.~e'Yly industrialising countries 
in Asia have followed? Is this not the'ti6nd that may, in the opinion 
of some crystal ball gazers, see the last of the communists in China 
eventually swepfaway ? Democracy may not be a feaSible project in 
all countries in the Mediterranean in the medium term. Respect for 
human rights short of full democratic rights may be, a more 
workable solution. 
Turning once more to the economic impact of the Free Trade Area, 
so far reference has been made to the long-term benefits and short-
run costs. It is worth outlining what these costs and benefits are. 
Some restructuring has already occurred in the MNCs to varying 
degrees. The libetalisation process, which will be accelerated by the 
free trade area should lead to the reallocation of economic resources 
and help the MNCs shift these towards those economic activities in 
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which they have a"'e6mparative advantage. Much will depend in this 
case on how fast this reallocation will take place.' The greater 
openness of the economy will encourage more competition and cut 
down excessive monopolistic profits. It will increase efficiency 
(more mergers and shutdowns of inefficient firms) but 
unemployment will increase. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) may be stimulated. But political 
instability, and bureaucratic bottlenecks might bring around a lower 
level of FDI than expected. Openness may also lead to 
disinvestment in the sense of firms presently situated in the MNCs 
relocating to . Europe, 'once they win still be free to export to the 
MNCs. The latter phenomenon may not be so large as to cause 
worries, but watch out for perceptions on political stability in the 
MNCs. . 
Lastly it is worth noting that many MNCs have already achieved the 
most they could have achieved given their present economies in 
their exports, to the EC, and the new Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership' agreements do 'not offer substantial improvements in 
this regard. On the other hand, the EU stands to gain more from 
trade' liberalisatiori both in the short-run as well.as in the long-run: 
Many MN Cs are already shifting their tax system from reliance on 
import tariffs to' consumption taxes (such as the introduction of 
VAT). An overhaul of the fiscal system is required in the MNCs to 
set up a new fiscal balance between revenue and expenditure. 
Liberalisation may also cause persistent balance of payments . 
difficulties as people spend more on consumption. In case of acute 
balance of payments difficulties the EU has promised that it will 
help the MNCs to overcome such difficulties in consultation with 
the International Monetary Fund (lMF). All in all, the MNCs win 
have to take a gradualist approach to liberalisation while at the same 
time accelerating measures to improve their economic 
infra~tructure, develop human resources and industrial restructuring. 
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The state of economic health of the Mediterranean 'Countries is such 
that caution must be advised in approaching reforms. Consider that 
according to World Bank's classification, in 1994-95, Jordan, 
Morocco and Syria were designated as severely indebted countries, 
while Albania, Egypt, Algeria, Greece, Tunisia, Turkey and the ex-
Yugoslav republics were moderately indebted countries. 14 
Unemployment is another concern, reflecting the fact that economic 
expansion has been unable to keep up with the expansion in the 
labour force caused by demographic changes lS. Rates of economic 
growth have to be increased massively if these countries are to 
provide enough job opportunities to keep up with, demographic 
changes. During periods of economic restructuring, economies 
might do exactly the opposite of what is needed of them, and shed 
jobs rather then create new ones. f 
In the abstract, the creation of a. Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade 
Area (FT A) will in the longer-run reap benefits for all the people" in 
the region thus helping to strengthen economic development, social 
. cohesion· and internal stability in most countries. It will also reap 
benefits for the EU which itself will be able to'increase its exports 
to the region. However, the' limited content which the Euro-
, Mediterranean free trade area has been given may yet rob it of its 
. major economic· impact. F or instance, it· IS detrimental that 
agricultural trade has been left out.and the free movement of labour; 
at least after a transitional phase, is similarly excluded.l In the past, 
as transpired during the setting up of the Global' Mediterranean 
Policy and during the negotiations with the MNCs preceding the 
second enlargement, further concessions to the MNCs on 
agricultural exports were welcomed by northern EU member states 
14 World Debt tables, 1994~95, the World Bank. 
15 Some of the latest available official unemployment figures published by the 
World Bank are: Algeria - 25%, Tunisia - 15%, Morocco - +20%. Jordan 15-
18%; Egypt - 15-20%; Israel - 7.5%. 
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and resisted pfl"M1lrily by the EU Mediterranean member states. The 
evidence is clear that although some concessions on agricultural 
trade were made by the Community, as is amply shown in the first 
three Euro-Mediterranean Partnership agreements concluded so far, 
the issue of further trade liberalisation in this sector was postponed 
until after the year 2000. For the MNCs, the weaker side in the 
bargaining which has taken place, half a loaf may be better than no 
bread at all. However, objectively considered, the EC has again 
shown its meanness in a sector where it could greatly help the 
MNCs without having to dip deeper in its coffers, something which 
it (the EC) is extremely reluctant to do. By its actions the EC is 
further retarding economic progress in the MNCs. 
One more important query that needs be answered concerns the 
seriousness with which the EU is pursuing the Euro-Mediterranean 
free trade area. How much hope. should we allow to glow in our 
hearts that the EU is keen on realising the Euro-Mediterranean free 
trade area ? This time the Community appears dead serious. 
Historically, the creation of a free trade area was the aim of the 
Global Mediterranean .Policy, but alas three full decades int,#~*at 
policy it has never come to pass, of course through no fault ~the 
Community. The main difficulty, though even in this case it is not 
: completely unproblematic, is not .the liberalisation of north-south 
trade; but the.: liberalisation of south-south trade ~ . and the free 
movement of factors. Not even the concession of cwnulative rules ' 
of origin granted to the Maghreb countries in the bilateral trading 
agreements signed with the EC since 1978 was enough to make 
these· states forge closer economic links between them. The. Arab 
Maghreb Union, which blows hot or cold depending on the situation 
in the region, has fallen short of expectations, despite its rational 
. underpinnings. In the absence of resolve among the MNCs or of the 
conditions which will lead to the realisation of the free trade on a 
south .. south basis, the European Union could possibly fill the gap by 
maintaining a leadership role and ensuring the continuation of the 
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momentum. Yet on past experience, the EU is prone to retreat from 
Mediterranean initiatives into long periods of neglect when it busies 
itself with internal affairs. For the future, the EU's "internal" agenda 
(the IGC, EMU etc) appears full. Externally its priority is 
enlargement to include the countries of central and eastern Europe, 
and not its relations with the Mediterranean countries. 
One important consideration is that although, apart from what has 
already been discussed so far, none of the EU world trading rivals 
are prepared to mount the kind of policy for the Mediterranean 
region which the EC has set up, the region is not impervious to non-
EU challenges such as those coming from lower cost producers in / 
- I 
Asia. The EU has every interest to consolidate its position in the, 
Mediterranean region. Then the EU's motivations for the creation of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade area are not simply altruistic( 
The FT A was not sought after by the MNCs which were happy with 
unilateral concessions and would have preferred to widen their 
benefits whiie carrying on ~ith economic restructuring and gradual 
trade liberalisation. World Trade Organisation' (WTO) .rules 
established by the Uruguay Round entail that preferential trading 
arrangements (PTAs) which,the EU has ,with 'the MNCs 'are legal 
only if they are eventually transformed into a free trade area within 
a reasonable time of around a decade, though this is not specified. 
PTAs have always militated against GATTis comer stone, the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) clause, but were tolerated on the grounds 
that the asymmetry which they introduced between trading partners, 
whereby the developed countries granted preferences to developing 
countries without requiring them to match these concessions by 
equal and reverse preferences, favoured the developing countries. 
Yesterday's dogma is today's untruth and there are abundant 
economic argwnents to show that this should no longer be blindly 
accepted. Following the Uruguay Round, interim agreements 
leading to the formation of a free trade area or _ a customs union are 
no longer free from a time constraint, and they have now to be 
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achieved over an agreed time frame accepted by the WTOI6. Hence 
the urgency of the EU to establish a time frame of 12 years to 
achieve its free trade area agreements with the MNCs. 
When due consideration is given to the WTO pressures and the fact 
that the EC for its own interests is intent on achieving the free trade 
area, it will appear that significant progress will be made on north-
south trade liberalisation, while south-south liberalisation (which 
may be of greater economic importance to the MNCs) may take 
much longer. In sum, the -difficulties in concluding the FTA are 
many: primarily there are three time factor problems, ie the length 
of time it is going to take to negotiate the myriad' accords to 
establish the free trade area, the constraint that the EC-MNC FT A 
will have to be established over a period of twelve years, and last 
but not least that this twelve year period, which may be short for the 
purposes, of economic transfonnation with palatable side-effects, 
may be too long for the political changes in the region. They might 
tum in such a way as to eventually overturn the whole process. 
Ironically; the longer the time frame, the bigger the danger that the 
process will < stall due to a worsening of the political situation in the 
region. 
There are however other difficulties: tariff dismantling and the three 
freedoms I 7 will not bring about the FTA unless trans-Mediterranean 
communications and transport networks are also established. 
16 Refer to the "understanding on the interpretation of article xxiv of the general 
agreement on tariffs and trade 1994,1 in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilatetal Trade negotiations. 
t 7 Observe that'iri con'cluding' the European Economic Area with the EFTA 
countries the Ee strove to achieve the so called four freedoms of labour, capital, 
services and goods. In the case of the countries of central and eastern Europe, the 
Ee made generous concessions to them in freedom of movement of labour when 
it signed the Eu~ope Agreements. In the case \ of the Mediterranean non-member 
countries, freedom 'of movement of labour has' been excluded. 
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The Barcelona Declaration makes ample reference to this. 
Achieving the networks will require a sustained investment effort. A 
large amount of learning how to conduct south-south trade is 
required, for the dominant trend is still the one established during 
the colonial era on a north-south axis. This will require a substantial 
amount of transfer of know-how from Europe to the south. 
i. 
In practical terms the eventual achievement of the Euro-
Mediterranean free trade area will depend in the first instance on the 
successful upgrading of the EU's present trading agreements with 
the MNCs, a process which has already started. Cyprus and Turkey / 
J 
have a customs union in place and in any case Cyprus and Malta 
will join the Union in about two years. New FT A agreements have 
been initialled with Tunisia, Israel and Morocco, while negotiation,s 
carry on with the rest. With regard to trade liberalisation and the 
four freedoms, as far as a south-south basis is concerned, what roay 
be easier is a round of m~tilatera1 trade negotiations between ali the 
states of the region very much on traditional GAIT pattern (or the 
EU-EFT A negotiations for .the EEA) with a priviously agreed tim~ .. 
frame for the conclusion of the agreement, and which will set out a 
working plan for the next twelve years. 
Turning to the political aspect of the' Euro-Mediterranean 
relationship, the first priority for Europe is to resolve clearly in its 
mind the tension between democracy and economic progress, both 
of which have been singled out as contributing· to security and 
stability in the region. The argument is that the successful launching 
of the FT A is essential for increasing the momentum of economic 
growth in the region and for achieving greater prosperity. Prosperity 
lessens social tensions and provides the conditions for internal 
stability, and in turn makes possible the full democratisation of 
societies. Democratisation of states lessens the chances of war or 
external conflict, though it does not remove the threat completely. It 
must not be assumed that fully fledged democracies do not go to 
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warlS or that the present conflict situations in the Mediterranean are 
all the result of the absence of democracy. Such mental leaps can 
lead to catastrophic policies. An analogous leap is to say that the 
end of superpower confrontation in the Mediterranean region has 
produced the conditions for ending the conflicts. Indeed, the end of 
the cold war may have haq beneficial effects on the Middle East but 
may for example have removed one of the strongest restraining 
influences on such historical rivals as Greece and Turkey~ The fall 
of communism may have deprived the radical states in the region of 
the moral.and material support of the USSR, but new challenges 
have arisen from international terrorism, supported very often from 
a number of far-flung countries outs~de the region. The dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, may have facilitated the proliferation of 
weapons, know-how and material for the construction of weapons 
of mass destruction. Indeed, there is no end of history in sight in the 
Mediterranean region. 
Resort to collective security arrangements are a tempting 
proposition but inherently flawed. Equally dangerous may be 
European institutional prototypesgrafied onto the region: such as the 
proposed Conf~rence on Security and Co-operation in the 
Mediterranean (CSCM), the Mediterranean Forum or the Council of 
the Mediterranean which create opportunities for parliamentarians 
but are so "Qroadly aimed that they. lose momentum; '>To borrow 
Bismarck's dictum from a completely different historical context, 
"the great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and 
the resolutions of majorities fl but by actions which are more lasting. 
The institutions mentioned above may ·become useful only when the 
urgent problems of economic reform have been solved and 
IBSee for example the ideas advanced by Raymond Cohen (and the polemic 
which' followed in subsequent issues) in "Pa~ific Unions: A Reappraisal of the 
Theory that Democracies do not go to War With Each Other" in The Review of 
International Studies, Volume 20, No 3, July 1994. 
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democratic government has become the norm. Unluckily for us, 
such institutions in the present conjecture may be instrumental in 
creating a fictitious sense of security, falling short of providing real 
security, and prolonging or stopping the search for a real cure. 
What may be a more workable solution will be one in which Europe 
will work actively with the main countries of the region in terms of 
territorial size, population and military strength, in respect of t~o or 
three of the most threatening issues in the region such as 
international terrorism, proliferation of the weapons of mass 
destruction and disarmament. The aim would be that lasting, 
verifiable and enforceable agreements are achieved. Once a criticij.l 
mass is thus achieved in the region, other areas could then be 
tackled. 
Conclusion 
. 
, 
Of 
The problems of the Mediterranean region are many but not 
incurable. This paper has concentrated on the main difficulties in 
achieving the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as I see them. The 
Partnership will ~ucceed if the variables discussed in this paper, or 
the majority of them, are constantly kept in the forefront. One thing 
is certain, there is a role for every country i~ the region to play. The 
EU, as the richest and most powerful entity in the region, must keep 
the momentum going constantly. The Barcelona Conference does 
not make the Euro-Med Partnership. The EU must take the lead in 
this, as it must assume the responsibility of giving the MNCs more 
market access, especially by opening its markets more to 
Mediterranean agricultural products. Economic reform in the MN Cs 
must take priority but this will be successful only if it moves 
forward with a velocity which would allow the national authorities 
to deal adequately with its negative side effects. The liberal notion 
that the market will deal with all problems is flawed and can 
produce disasters whereby uripopul~ economic changes give rise to 
alternative totalitarianism in the MNCs. The EU can do a lot to help 
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:this process, forward primarily by· reforming its own financial 
resources with a view to providing more finance to undetwrite the 
reform processes. The time factor is enigmatic: the longer the 
problems are left untackled, the worse they grow. Too fast a 
reforming move forward may create negative repercussions which 
may arrest the process. The more time passes, the greater the 
possibility that the political setting will become hostile to' further 
reforms before the project h~s been successfully concluded. 
'Political and economic questions are deeply intertwined and the EU 
cannot hope to execute its role satisfactorily by limiting itself to the 
traditional tools of the GMP, namely economic statecraft, or to 
those of EPC, namely a declarative foreign policy. The principal 
role of the MNCs will consist in maintaining the refonns at home, 
opening up with vigour to south-south economic integration, and 
moving their societies further along the path of democracy and 
human rights without endangering the whole process. Lastly, the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership cannot be considered as a costless 
project. In the short run, the MNCs must bear the burdens of 
transformation while the EU must bear the costs of financing it. The 
EU is mean\'{hile negotiating Euro-Partnership agreements with the 
MNCs. It has concluded one such agreement with Tunisia and one 
with Morocco. 
It is busily concluding one with Egypt and has upgraded its 
agreement with Israel. All of these bear the stamp of the 
unequalness of the two negotiating sides. The .superior economic 
power of the Union brought to bear against the singular weakness of 
the individual MNCs could not have produced a more balanced 
outcome. Here lies Europe's main weakness: it proclaims a Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership but at the same time it has not only taken 
the lead, (as it is expected to do) to set the ball rolling, but is 
imposing its strength, thus denuding the partnership concept of its 
proper meaning. Europe understands, perhaps as no other power, 
that the economic weaknesses of the MNCs and their divisiveness, 
. (they all want to negotiate singularly in a vain attempt to maximise 
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their unilateral national advantage) makes them "deal takers" and 
certainly not "deal makers". 
Lastly, it is important for Europe to depart from the neo-liberal 
notion of excessive reliance on market forces to put everything right 
that is wrong. It will not work. Perhaps when considering liberal 
philosophies, the answer to today's dilemmas may lie more in the 
ideas of its founding fathers of the past two centuries then in its 
modem exponents. Certainly this is not a call to a post-modernist 
assessment but having opened this Pandora's Box, it is not my 
intention to try to close it here. " 
f 
